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to those earnings （or losses） were reached intelligently。
我们之所以愿意承担比一般保险公司更多的风险，主要有两个原因： （1）以会计原则的规范标准，我们的保险公司净值高达60亿美金，位居全美第二（2）我们并不在乎每季的短期盈余数字，就算是每年也无所谓，只要长期而言，这些决策是基于稳健获利的立场所作的明智决定。
Obviously； if we write 250 million of catastrophe coverage and retain it all ourselves； there is some probability that we will lose the full 250 million in a single quarter。 That probability is low； but it is not zero。 If we had a loss of that magnitude； our after…tax cost would be about 165 million。 Though that is far more than Berkshire normally earns in a quarter； the damage would be a blow only to our pride； not to our well…being。
很明显地如此我们接下二亿五的灾害保险，并自留大部分的保额，很有可能我们会在一夕之间损失这二亿五，这种机率虽然很低，却并不表示没有可能，若真的发生那样的损失，我们的税后损失大概会是1。65亿，相较于Berkshire每季所赚的盈余来说，只能算是个小数字，虽然会我们会丢了面子，但还不至于失了里子。
This posture is one few insurance managements will assume。 Typically； they are willing to write scads of business on terms that almost guarantee them mediocre returns on equity。 But they do not want to expose themselves to an embarrassing single…quarter loss； even if the managerial strategy that causes the loss promises； over time； to produce superior results。 I can understand their thinking： What is best for their owners is not necessarily best for the managers。 Fortunately Charlie and I have both total job security and financial interests that are identical with those of our shareholders。 We are willing to look foolish as long as we don't feel we have acted foolishly。
这种态度在保险业界来说实在是少之又少，通常一般的保险公司会愿意接下很多的保单以确定公司每年可以获得一定的利益，但他们却不愿意公司在某一个单季发生大额的损失，虽然这种短期损失可以获致更长远的利益；我想我能够体谅他们的立场，对股东最有利的事并一定对经理人最好，很幸运的查理跟我的工作保障与身家利益与所有的股东皆一致，我们愿意被人当作是傻子，只要我们自己知道我们不是个傻子。
Our method of operation； incidentally； makes us a stabilizing force in the industry。 We add huge capacity when capacity is short and we bee less petitive only when capacity is abundant。 Of course； we don't follow this policy in the interest of stabilization … we follow it because we believe it to be the most sensible and profitable course of action。 Nevertheless； our behavior steadies the market。 In this case； Adam Smith's invisible hand works as advertised。
事实上我们这样的经营策略让我们成为市场上的稳定力量，当供给短缺时，我们可以马上进场满足大家的需求，而当市场过于饱和时，我们又会立即退出市场观望，当然我们这样的做法并不只是为了达到市场的稳定而已，我们之所以会这样做是因为我们认为这样才是最合理、对大家最有利的做法，当然这样的做法间接达到稳定市场的效果，也符合亚当．史密斯所提市场有一只看不见的手的说法。
Currently； we hold an exceptional amount of float pared to premium volume。 This circumstance should produce quite favorable insurance results for us during the next few years as it did in 1989。 Our underwriting losses should be tolerable and our investment ine from policyholder funds large。 This pleasant situation； however； will gradually deteriorate as our float runs off。
现阶段相较于保费收入，我们自留的大部分的浮存金，这样的情形应该可以让我们往后几年的获利像1989年那样不错的结果，承保损失应该还可以接受，相较之下我们靠投资所赚得的利益却更为惊人，只是这种好现象可能会随着浮存金的流失而渐渐光芒不再。
At some point； however； there will be an opportunity for us to write large amounts of profitable business。 Mike Goldberg and his management team of Rod Eldred； Dinos Iordanou； Ajit Jain； Phil Urban； and Don Wurster continue to position us well for this eventuality。
不过在其它方面，还是有机会能够让我们找到大额且有利可图的生意，Mike Goldberg与其经营团队，长期而言可以为我们创造有利的地位。
Marketable Securities
有价证券投资
In selecting marketable securities for our insurance panies； we generally choose among five major categories： （1） long…term mon stock investments； （2） medium…term fixed ine securities； （3） long…term fixed ine securities； （4） short…term cash equivalents； and （5） short…term arbitrage mitments。
在为我们的保险事业选择有价证券投资之时，我们主要有五种选择（1）长期股票投资（2）长期固定收益债券（3）中期固定收益债券（4）短期约当现金（5）短期套利交易。
We have no particular bias when it es to choosing from these categories； we just continuously search among them for the highest after…tax returns as measured by 〃mathematical expectation；〃 limiting ourselves always to investment alternatives we think we understand。 Our criteria have nothing to do with maximizing immediately reportable earnings； our goal； rather； is to maximize eventual net worth。
对于这五种类型的交易，我们没有特别的偏好，我们只是持续不断地寻找最高的税后报酬预计的数学期望值，且仅限于我们自认为了解熟悉的投资，我们无意让与短期的帐面盈余好看，我们的目标是让长期的净值极大化。
Below we list our mon stock holdings having a value of over 100 million。 A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100％。
下表是我们超过一亿美元以上的普通股投资，一部份的投资系属于Berkshire关系企业所持有）。
12/31/89
Shares pany Cost Market （000s omitted）
3；000；000 Capital Cities/ABC； Inc。 。。。。。。。。。 。。。。。。。。。。 517；500 1；692；375
23；350；000 The Coca…Cola Co。 。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。 。。。。。。。。 1；023；920 1；803；787
2；400；000 Federal Home Loan Mortgage Cor。。。。。 71；729 161；100
6；850；000 GEICO Corp。 。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。 。。 。。。 。。。。。。。。。。。 45；713 1；044；625
1；727；765 The Washington Post pany 。。。。。。。。。 9；731 486；366
This list of panies is the same as last year's and in only one case has the number of shares changed： Our holdings of Coca…Cola increased from 14；172；500 shares at the end of 1988 to 23；350；000。
表上的投资组合与去年几乎相同，只有一项投资的持股有变动，我们将可口可乐的持股数由去年的1；417万股提高到今年的2；335万股。
This Coca…Cola investment provides yet another example of the incredible speed with which your Chairman responds to investment opportunities； no matter how obscure or well…disguised they may be。 I believe I had my first Coca…Cola in either 1935 or 1936。 Of a certainty； it was in 1936 that I started buying Cokes at the rate of six for 25 cents from Buffett & Son； the family grocery store； to sell around the neighborhood for 5 cents each。 In this excursion into high…margin retailing； I duly observed the extraordinary consumer attractiveness and mercial possibilities of the product。
这次的可口可乐投资，提供了一个机会来证明你们的董事长快速反应投资机会，不管这些机会是如何的不明确或是被隐藏，我记得我是在1935年或1936年第一次喝到可口可乐的，不过可以确定的是，我从1936年开始以25分钱半打从巴菲特兄弟杂货店批货后，在以每罐5分钱卖给邻居街坊，作为我个人从事高毛利零售业的开端，我也深深观察到这项产品给消费者特殊的吸引力及背后所代表庞大的商机。
I continued to note these qualities for the next 52 years as Coke blanketed the world。 During this period； however； I carefully avoided buying even a single share； instead allocating major portions of my net worth to street railway panies； windmill manufacturers； anthracite producers； textile businesses； trading…stamp issuers； and the like。 （If you think I'm making this up； I can supply the names。） Only in the summer of 1988 did my brain finally establish contact with my eyes。
在往后的52年内当可口可乐席卷全世界的同时，我也持续地注意到这种特质，然而在同一段期间，由于我个人过于小心谨慎以致于竟然连一股都没有买，反而将大部分的个人资产投注在街车公司、纺织公司、煤炭公司与邮票公司之类的股票之上，（如果你认为这是我编造的笑话，我可以再告诉大家确实的公司名称），终于到了1988年的夏天，我的大脑与眼睛完成了联机动作。
What I then perceived was both clear and fascinating。 After drifting somewhat in the 1970's； Coca…Cola had in 1981 bee a new pany with the move of Roberto Goizueta to CEO。 Roberto； along with Don Keough； once my across…the…street neighbor in Omaha； first rethought and focused the pany's policies and then energetically carried them out。 What was already the world's most ubiquitous product gained new momentum； with sales overseas virtually exploding。
一时之间，我的观感与眼界大开，在1970年代一度委靡不振之后，可口可乐在1981年新任总裁古崔塔的带领下，焕然一新，古崔塔加上Don Keough（曾经是我在奥玛哈的对街邻居），经过思考并厘清公司的政策后，切实地加以执行，使得本来就已是全世界最独一无二的产品又平添新动力，尤其是来自海外的营收更呈现爆炸性的成长。
Through a truly rare blend of marketing and financial skills； Roberto has maximized both the growth of his product and the rewards that this growth brings to shareholders。 Normally； the CEO of a consumer products pany； drawing on his natural inclinations or experience； will cause either marketing or finance to dominate the business at the expense of the other discipline。 With Roberto； the mesh of marketing and finance is perfect and the result is a shareholder's dream。
利用其行销与财务方面的两把利刃，古崔塔将可口可乐产品的成长与股东的利益极大化，通常一家消费性商品的CEO，基于个人过去的经验与个性，会偏向公司的行销或财务任何一边，但是古崔塔却能够将两者调和到极致的境界，这样的结果实在是股东们前世修来的好福气。
Of course； we should have started buying Coke much earlier； soon after Roberto and Don began running things。 In fact； if I had been thinking straight I would have persuaded my grandfather to sell the grocery store back in 1936 and put all of the proceeds into Coca…Cola stock。 I've learned my lesson： My response time to the next glaringly attractive idea will be slashed to well under 50 years。
当然我们应该在古崔塔与Don开始接掌公司时，就早点买进该公司的股票，事实上，要是我有足够的远见，早在1936年我就应该说服我爷爷干脆卖掉杂货店，然后将钱全部用来买进可口可乐的股票，这次我终于学到了教训，不过照这种情况看来，距离下一次我灵光一现的时间，可能要再等上个50年以上吧！
As I mentioned earlier； the yearend prices of our major investees were much higher relative to their intrinsic values than theretofore。 While those prices may not yet cause nosebleeds； they are clearly vulnerable to a general market decline。 A drop in their prices would not disturb us at all … it might in fact work to our eventual benefit … but it would cause at least a one…year reduction in Berkshire's net worth。 We think such a reduction is almost certain in at least one of the next three years。 Indeed； it would take only about a 10％ year…to…year decline in the aggregate value of our portfolio investments to send Berkshire's net worth down。
就像是我上次所提到的，相较于过去，我们这些被投资公司的股价已高于其实质价值，虽然目前以这种价位不会造成我们流鼻血，但难免会受到大盘波动的影响，当然股价下挫一点都不会造成我们的困扰，甚至反而对我们有利，但不可避免地可能会造成Berkshire年度净值的减少，只要在未来的两、三年间，我们的投资组合市值平均每年减少10％，就有可能会发生这种状况。
We continue to be blessed with extraordinary managers at our portfolio panies。 They are high…grade； talented； and shareholder…oriented。 The exceptional results we have achieved while investing with them accurately reflect their exceptional personal qualities。
我们持续受惠于这些被投资公司经理人，他们高品格、能力佳且设身处地为股东着想，我们能够有这么好的投资绩效，可以说是完全仰赖这些经理人不凡的人格特质。
o We told you last year that we expected to do little in arbitrage during 1989； and that's the way it turned out。 Arbitrage positions are a substitute for short…term cash equivalents； and during part of the year we held relatively low levels of cash。 In the rest of the year we had a fairly good…sized cash position and even so chose not to engage in arbitrage。 The main reason was corporate transactions that made no economic sense to us； arbitraging such deals es too close to playing the greater…fool game。 （As Wall Streeter Ray DeVoe says： 〃Fools rush in where angels fear to trade。〃） We will engage in arbitrage from time to time … sometimes on a large scale … but only when we like the odds。
去年我曾向各位报告今年可能会减少在套利投资方面的活动，结果正是如此，套利投资是短期资金的替代去处，有时我们手头上没有太多的现金，就算是有我们也宁愿选择不参与套利，主要的原因是因为最近这些企业活动实在是没有太大的经济意义，从事这类的套利交易就好象是在比谁比较笨，华尔街人士Ray DeVoe所说天使回避但傻瓜趋之若骛，我们三不五时会从事大型的套利交易，但只有当我们觉得胜算颇大时，才会考虑进场。
o Leaving aside the three convertible preferreds discussed in the n