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镜募ㄐП硐郑赐曛竽憔突崦髁耍挝叶晕颐堑谋Ｏ帐乱稻砣耍琈ike Goldberg与他的明星团队Rod Eldred、Dinos Lordanou、Ajit Jalin与Don Wurster的表现会感到如此满意了。
In assessing our insurance results over the next few years； you should be aware of one type of business we are pursuing that could cause them to be unusually volatile。 If this line of business expands； as it may； our underwriting experience will deviate from the trendline you might expect： In most years we will somewhat exceed expectations and in an occasional year we will fall far below them。
在衡量我们保险事业过去几年的经营绩效时，大家必须特别注意因为我们所追求的生意形态而造成经营结果的波动，若是这类型的生意扩张，事实上这很有可能，则我们的承保结果可能会与一般产业趋势有很大的差异，大部分的时候，我们的成绩会超乎大家的预期，但很有可能在某一年度又大幅落后在产业标准之下。
The volatility I predict reflects the fact that we have bee a large seller of insurance against truly major catastrophes （〃super…cats〃）； which could for example be hurricanes； windstorms or earthquakes。 The buyers of these policies are reinsurance panies that themselves are in the business of writing catastrophe coverage for primary insurers and that wish to 〃lay off；〃 or rid themselves； of part of their exposure to catastrophes of special severity。 Because the need for these buyers to collect on such a policy will only arise at times of extreme stress … perhaps even chaos … in the insurance business； they seek financially strong sellers。 And here we have a major petitive advantage： In the industry； our strength is unmatched。
我预估的波动主要是反应在我们即将成为真正超大型意外灾害保单（又称霹雳猫）承保人的事实之上，这些灾害有可能是飓风、风暴或是地震，这类保单的购买者大多是接受一般保险业者分散风险的再保公司，由于他们自己本身也要分散或是卸下部份单一重要灾害的风险，而由于这些保险公司主要是希望在发生若干重大的意外后，在一片混乱之中还能有可以依靠的对象，所以在选择投保对象时，首重的就是财务实力，而这正是我们最主要的竞争优势，在这个业界，我们坚强的实力是别人所比不上的。
A typical super…cat contract is plicated。 But in a plain… vanilla instance we might write a one…year； 10 million policy providing that the buyer； a reinsurer； would be paid that sum only if a catastrophe caused two results： （1） specific losses for the reinsurer above a threshold amount； and （2） aggregate losses for the insurance industry of； say； more than 5 billion。 Under virtually all circumstances； loss levels that satisfy the second condition will also have caused the first to be met。
典型的霹雳猫合约相当的复杂，不过以一个最简单的例子来说，我们可能签下一年期，1；000万美元的保单，其中规定再保公司在灾害造成两种状况下才有可能得到理赔，（1）再保公司的损失超过一定的门槛（2）整个保险业界的总损失超过一定的门槛，假设是50亿美元，只是通常在第二种条件符合时，第一个条件也会达到标准。
For this 10 million policy； we might receive a premium of； say； 3 million。 Say； also； that we take in annual premiums of 100 million from super…cat policies of all kinds。 In that case we are very likely in any given year to report either a profit of close to 100 million or a loss of well over 200 million。 Note that we are not spreading risk as insurers typically do； we are concentrating it。 Therefore； our yearly bined ratio on this business will almost never fall in the industry range of 100 … 120； but will instead be close to either zero or 300％。
对于这种1；000万的保单，我们收取的保费可能会在300万左右，假设我们一年收到所有的霹雳猫保费收入为1亿美元，则有可能某些年度我们可以认列将近1亿美元的利益，但也有可能在单一年度要认列2亿美元的损失，值得注意的是我们不像其它保险公司是在分散风险，相反地我们是将风险集中，因此在这一部份，我们的综合比率不像一般业者会介于100…120之间，而是有可能会介于0…300之间。
Most insurers are financially unable to tolerate such swings。 And if they have the ability to do so； they often lack the desire。 They may back away； for example； because they write gobs of primary property insurance that would deliver them dismal results at the very time they would be experiencing major losses on super… cat reinsurance。 In addition； most corporate managements believe that their shareholders dislike volatility in results。
当然有许多业者无法承受这样大幅的变动，而且就算有能力可以做到，他们的意愿也不会太高，他们很可能在吃下一大笔保单之后，因为灾害发生一时必须承担大额的损失而被吓跑，此外大部分的企业管理阶层会认为他们背后的股东应该不喜欢变动太大。
We can take a different tack： Our business in primary property insurance is small and we believe that Berkshire shareholders； if properly informed； can handle unusual volatility in profits so long as the swings carry with them the prospect of superior long…term results。 （Charlie and I always have preferred a lumpy 15％ return to a smooth 12％。）
不过我们采取的方向就不同了，我们在初级产险市场的业务相当少，但我们相信Berkshire的股东，若事先经过沟通，应该可以接受这种获利波动较大，只要最后长期的结果能够令人满意就可以的经营结果，（查理跟我总是喜欢变动的15％更胜于固定的12％）。
We want to emphasize three points： （1） While we expect our super…cat business to produce satisfactory results over； say； a decade； we're sure it will produce absolutely terrible results in at least an occasional year； （2） Our expectations can be based on little more than subjective judgments … for this kind of insurance； historical loss data are of very limited value to us as we decide what rates to charge today； and （3） Though we expect to write significant quantities of super…cat business； we will do so only at prices we believe to be mensurate with risk。 If petitors bee optimistic； our volume will fall。 This insurance has； in fact； tended in recent years to be woefully underpriced； most sellers have left the field on stretchers。
我们有三点必须要强调（1）我们预期霹雳猫的业务长期来讲，假设以10年为期，应该可以获得令人满意的结果，当然我们也知道在这其中的某些年度成绩可能会很惨（2）我们这样的预期并非是基于客观的判断，对于这样的保险业务，历史的资料对于我们在做订价决策时并没有太大的参考价值（3）虽然我们准备签下大量的霹雳猫保单，但有一个很重要的前提那就是价格必须要能够与所承担的风险相当，所以若我们的竞争对手变得乐观积极，那么我们的量就会马上减少，事实上过去几年市场价格有点低的离谱，这使得大部分的参与者都被用担架抬离场。
At the moment； we believe Berkshire to be the largest U。S。 writer of super…cat business。 So when a major quake occurs in an urban area or a winter storm rages across Europe； light a candle for us。
在此同时，我们相信Berkshire将会成为全美最大的霹雳猫承保公司，所以要是那天都会地区发生大地震或是发生席卷欧陆地区的风暴时，请点亮蜡烛为我们祈祷。
Measuring Insurance Performance衡量保险业的表现
In the previous section I mentioned 〃float；〃 the funds of others that insurers； in the conduct of their business； temporarily hold。 Because these funds are available to be invested； the typical property…casualty insurer can absorb losses and expenses that exceed premiums by 7％ to 11％ and still be able to break even on its business。 Again； this calculation excludes the earnings the insurer realizes on net worth … that is； on the funds provided by shareholders。
在前段文章我曾提到浮存金…也就是保险业者在从事业务时，所暂时持有的资金，因为这些资金可以用在投资之上，所以产物意外险公司即使在损失与费用超过保费收入7％到11％，仍能自行吸收达到损益两平，当然这要扣除保险业者本身的净值，也就是股东自有资金所产生的获利。
However； many exceptions to this 7％ to 11％ range exist。 For example； insurance covering losses to crops from hail damage produces virtually no float at all。 Premiums on this kind of business are paid to the insurer just prior to the time hailstorms are a threat； and if a farmer sustains a loss he will be paid almost immediately。 Thus； a bined ratio of 100 for crop hail insurance produces no profit for the insurer。
当然7％到11％的范围还是有许多例外情况，例如保险业者承保谷物冰雹伤害损失几乎没有浮存金的贡献，保险业者通常是在冰雹即将来临之前才收到保费收入，而只要其中有任何一位农夫发生损失就要马上支付赔偿金，因此即使谷物冰雹保险的综合比率为100，保险业者也赚不了半毛钱。
At the other extreme； malpractice insurance covering the potential liabilities of doctors； lawyers and accountants produces a very high amount of float pared to annual premium volume。 The float materializes because claims are often brought long after the alleged wrongdoing takes place and because their payment may be still further delayed by lengthy litigation。 The industry calls malpractice and certain other kinds of liability insurance 〃long… tail〃 business； in recognition of the extended period during which insurers get to hold large sums that in the end will go to claimants and their lawyers （and to the insurer's lawyers as well）。
另外一个极端的例子，执行业务过失保险…一种专门提供给医师、律师与会计师分散可能责任风险的保险，较之每年收到的保费收入，这部份险种的浮存金就很高，这种浮存金之所以很重要的原因在于理赔申请案通常会在业务过失发生很长一段时间之后才会提出，而且真正理赔的时点也会因冗长的法律诉讼程序结束后才会执行，保险业界统称业务过失保险与其它特定种类的责任保险为〃长尾巴业务〃意思是说保险业者在将理赔金支付给申请人跟他的律师（或甚至是保险公司的律师）之前，可以持有这一大笔的资金相当长的一段时间。
In long…tail situations a bined ratio of 115 （or even more） can prove profitable； since earnings produced by the float will exceed the 15％ by which claims and expenses overrun premiums。 The catch； though； is that 〃long…tail〃 means exactly that： Liability business written in a given year and presumed at first to have produced a bined ratio of 115 may eventually smack the insurer with 200； 300 or worse when the years have rolled by and all claims have finally been settled。
像这种长尾巴业务，通常即使综合比率高达115（或更高）都还可能有获利，因为在索赔与费用发生之前的那一段时间利用浮存金所赚的利润甚至会超过15％，但重点是所谓的长尾巴顾名思义，就是在某一年度承接的责任保险保单之时，假设会有115的综合比率，但结果到最后尾大不掉，经过多年的纠缠，终于和解的结果，有可能让保险业者承担200、300或是更糟的综合比率。
The pitfalls of this business mandate an operating principle that too often is ignored： Though certain long…tail lines may prove profitable at bined ratios of 110 or 115； insurers will invariably find it unprofitable to price using those ratios as targets。 Instead； prices must provide a healthy margin of safety against the societal trends that are forever springing expensive surprises on the insurance industry。 Setting a target of 100 can itself result in heavy losses； aiming for 110 … 115 is business suicide。
这项业务一定要特别注意一项时常令人忽略的经营原则的陷阱，虽然部份长尾巴业务在110到115的综合比率之间仍可以获利，但若是保险业者依此比率来订定保费价格的话很可能会亏大钱，所以保费价格必须要有一个安全的边际空间以防止当今总是会让保险业有昂贵的意外蹦出来的社会趋势，将综合比率设在100一定会产生重大的损失，将目标锁定在110…115之间则无异是自杀的行为。
All of that said； what should the measure of an insurer's profitability be？ Analysts and managers customarily look to the bined ratio … and it's true that this yardstick usually is a good indicator of where a pany ranks in profitability。 We believe a better measure； however； to be a parison of underwriting loss to float developed。
说了那么多，到底该如何衡量一家保险公司的获利能力呢？ 分析师与经理人通常习惯性的会去看综合比率，当然在我们要看一家保险公司是否赚钱时，这项比率是一个很好的正确指针，但我们认为还有一项数字是更好的衡量标准，那就是承保损失与浮存金的比率。
This loss/float ratio； like any statistic used in evaluating insurance results； is meaningless over short time periods： Quarterly underwriting figures and even annual ones are too heavily based on estimates to be much good。 But when the ratio takes in a period of years； it gives a rough indication of the cost of funds generated by insurance operations。 A low cost of funds signifies a good business； a high cost translates into a poor business。
这种损失/浮存金比率跟其它保险业常用的绩效衡量统计数字一样，必须要有一段相当长的时间才有意义，单季或甚至是单一年度的数字，会因为估计的成份太浓而无参考价值，但是只要时间一拉长，这个比率就可以告诉我们保险营运所产生浮存金的资金成本，若资金成本低就代表这是一家好公司，相反地就是一家烂公司。
On the next page we show the underwriting loss； if any； of our insurance group in each year since we entered the business and relate that bottom line to the average float we have held during the year。 From this data we have puted a 〃cost of funds developed from insurance。〃
下一页是我们进入保险业后，每年的�